

## Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization

John S. Dryzek

*The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 90, No. 3. (Sep., 1996), pp. 475-487.

Stable URL:

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28199609%2990%3A3%3C475%3APIATDO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0>

*The American Political Science Review* is currently published by American Political Science Association.

---

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html>. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at <http://www.jstor.org/journals/apsa.html>.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

---

JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).



# Political Inclusion and the Dynamics of Democratization

JOHN S. DRYZEK *University of Melbourne*

Once universal adult citizenship rights have been secured in a society, democratization is mostly a matter of the more authentic political inclusion of different groups and categories, for which formal political equality can hide continued exclusion or oppression. It is important, however, to distinguish between inclusion in the state and inclusion in the polity more generally. Democratic theorists who advocate a strategy of progressive inclusion of as many groups as possible in the state fail to recognize that the conditions for authentic as opposed to symbolic inclusion are quite demanding. History shows that benign inclusion in the state is possible only when (a) a group's defining concern can be assimilated to an established or emerging state imperative, and (b) civil society is not unduly depleted by the group's entry into the state. Absent such conditions, oppositional civil society may be a better focus for democratization than is the state. A flourishing oppositional sphere, and therefore the conditions for democratization itself, may actually be facilitated by a passively exclusive state, the main contemporary form of which is corporatism. Benign inclusion in the state can sometimes occur, but any such move should also produce exclusions that both facilitate future democratization and guard against any reversal of democratic commitment in state and society. These considerations have substantial implications for the strategic choices of social movements.

## DEMOCRATIZATION AS INCLUSION

If democracy is a good thing (as almost everyone everywhere now seems to believe), then more democracy should presumably be an even better thing. Today there is a widespread sense, among political theorists at least, that democracy is an unfinished project, not just in terms of the spread of liberal democratic institutions to more and more corners of the world but also in terms of deepening of the democratic qualities of all societies.<sup>1</sup> Democratization in this latter sense is largely (though not solely) a matter of the progressive inclusion of various groups and categories of people in political life.<sup>2</sup> With the struggle for universal adult citizenship rights now more or less over in the industrial democracies, the attention of theorists and activists alike has turned to how democracy might be made more substantial and effective through greater efforts to include a variety of disadvantaged categories and groups for which the formal promise of democratic equality has masked continued exclusion or oppression (see Phillips 1995). Candidates for such inclusion are ethnic and religious minorities, indigenous peoples, women, the old, gays and lesbians, youth, the unemployed, the underclass, recent immigrants, people exposed to environmental risks, and (if only by proxy) future generations. With the demise of socialism and its often exclusive emphasis on the emancipation of the working class, such inclusive democratic endeavors are especially attractive to many on the left (e.g., Laclau and Mouffe 1985).

While recognizing that the effective inclusion of more groups and categories in the polity is central to democ-

ratization, I want to question any predisposition toward inclusion sponsored by, or sought in, the state, which may be defined as the set of individuals and organizations legally authorized to make binding decisions for a society. Entry into the state can come through organization as an interest group and associated lobbying activities; participation in policy development and implementation through ongoing negotiation between group leaders and public officials; participation in conventional party and electoral politics, either by organizing as a party or in formal affiliation with an established party; acceptance of governmental appointments by group leaders; or enhancing the group's ability to participate in policymaking through changes in public policy. This sort of inclusion or entry into the state therefore involves more than the attainment of basic citizenship rights, such as the right to vote and associate, which I shall take for granted. I argue that inclusion in the state is only benign if some fairly demanding criteria are met, and that when these criteria are not met, inclusion in the polity beyond the state is more appropriate.

Democratic theorists have, of course, always assumed that the state is the main locus of their concerns; indeed, this assumption is so universal and unremarkable that it is not often noted. Robert Dahl (1989, 37) makes a rare explicit acknowledgment: "Advocates of the democratic process have always meant it to be applied to the state." I will suggest that such an exclusive focus is often inappropriate, at least in the developed liberal democracies. Much of the time we should look instead to the polity beyond the state. In the past, the main nonstate focus of democratic theorists was the workplace. More recently, some attention has been paid to civil society (see Cohen and Arato 1992),<sup>3</sup> though that sphere remains both contested and ambiguous, as does its relationship to the state. Here I wish to both clarify and advance this emphasis on civil society.

Wariness of political inclusion is common in the ranks of conservatives and classical liberals. Conservatives

John S. Dryzek is Professor of Political Science, University of Melbourne, Parkville 3052, Australia.

For advice and criticism I thank Erik Engstrom, Robert Goodin, Claus Offe, Iris Young, and the *Review's* five anonymous referees.

<sup>1</sup> Moreover, warnings about the "democratic distemper" accompanying excessive public demands upon the state are less frequent today than they were two decades ago (i.e., Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975).

<sup>2</sup> This is not all democratization can mean. Within a society, it can also entail an increase in the scope (or range) of issues brought under popular control, or an increase in the authenticity of that control.

<sup>3</sup> Attention has also focused on the international system, though that is beyond my scope here.

want to repel destabilizing threats to the established order, and liberals want to protect their ideal of universal rights assigned equally to individuals irrespective of their characteristics, rather than to particular categories or groups. My own argument for highly selective inclusion is different in that it proceeds from the point of view of democratization itself. It is important to distinguish between inclusion in politics and inclusion in the state. Democrats should generally favor a state that is exclusive in important aspects, for exclusion properly arranged can benefit democracy and democratization, even from the point of view of those excluded. (That exclusion can do so from the point of view of those included has been a staple of republican thinking through the ages, from antiquity to Arendt [1958].) In some circumstances, inclusion in the state is defensible, so it becomes important to determine whether these circumstances obtain for particular groups facing the possibility of inclusion in particular contexts.

An examination of the history of democratization indicates that pressures for greater democracy almost always emanate from oppositional civil society, rarely or never from the state itself. If a group leaves this oppositional sphere to enter the state, then dominant classes and public officials have less to fear in the way of public protest. There may be some democratic gain in this entry, but there is also democratic loss in terms of a less vital civil society, the erosion of some existing democratic accomplishments, and a reduced likelihood of further democratization in the future. Moreover, the democratic gain is itself uncertain. I will argue that such gain can only be secured when the defining interest of the entering group can be connected quite directly to an existing or emerging state imperative. This connection can be made when an equivalence is discovered between the goods sought by a group and some aspect of what the state must do in terms of public policy. If the group's interest cannot be so assimilated, then the group in question receives only symbolic rewards. Such co-option has been a standing concern of observers of the role of groups in democratic systems. Co-option was defined long ago by Selznick (1966, 13) as "the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence," though in the normal pejorative sense in which co-option is understood, such absorption comes without any real power sharing.<sup>4</sup>

The dynamics of democratization reveal a subtle interplay between inclusion and exclusion, the state and civil society. I will conclude with some criteria that help to determine whether any particular group's inclusion in the state constitutes a democratic gain or loss for the group in question and, more importantly, for the polity as a whole. Let me begin by exploring in more detail some of the implicitly or explicitly statist arguments that have been advanced on behalf of inclusion.

## THE INCLUSIVE STATE

Among the most visible proposals for democratic inclusion are those now advanced by "difference democrats," many of whom are also feminists. According to difference democrats, people are different from one another in fundamental ways, and to treat them as similar—e.g., by granting them all the same formal rights and the same access to politics—effectively extinguishes any political manifestation of difference (Young 1989, 1990). For example, indigenous peoples in Canada, the United States, or Australia are enfranchised under "one person, one vote." But given their numbers and geographical dispersal, this effectively denies them any representation in national legislatures. New Zealand has long recognized this problem and has set aside a number of Maori seats in parliament.<sup>5</sup> This does not mean that electoral reform is a sufficient remedy, for many other aspects of political systems make it difficult for disadvantaged groups to attain real recognition and access, even when these groups are large.

To some difference democrats, notably Anne Phillips (1993, 96–9), these considerations suggest only such measures as setting aside quotas of seats in parliament for particular categories of people, such as women. Political parties in Scandinavia and (recently) Britain have adopted quota systems of just this kind. Phillips is otherwise keen to preserve the basic structure of liberal democracy. She does not suggest that the representatives in question have a special charge to speak for women and only as women; it is enough that they simply *are* women.

Iris Young draws more radical inferences from the principle of difference. She finds the idea of universal citizenship repressive, as it does not recognize experiences and interests different in kind from those already dominant. Apparently universal rights and principles turn out, on closer inspection, to be tailored to the interests of upper-class white males. Young believes that universality erases everything that is particular, different, and valuable in the experience and identity of oppressed groups. Such groups should therefore retain their solidarity and distinctive identity in their representation and in their treatment by public policy. Historically oppressed groups which, in the United States, she identifies as "women, blacks, Native Americans, old people, poor people, disabled people, gay men and lesbians, Spanish-speaking Americans, young people, and nonprofessional workers" (Young 1989, 265) should be guaranteed not just representation in the legislature but also veto power over policies that affect them, and guarantees that public officials will respond to their concerns. In other words, the group should be represented *qua* group, rather than merely electing individual representatives with the characteristics of the group.

Now, the idea that the representation of groups rather than individuals should be the locus of democratic politics is not unique to contemporary difference democrats. Pluralists have always interpreted state-related

<sup>4</sup> For a detailed analysis of the hazards of co-option, especially for resource-poor groups, see Seward (1992).

<sup>5</sup> One parliamentary seat in the German *land* of Schleswig-Holstein is reserved for the tiny Danish minority.

politics in terms of the interaction of groups, and public policy as the output of that interaction. Midcentury U.S. pluralists such as David Truman (1951) and Robert Dahl (1956) may not have had the same set of interests in mind as do the difference democrats, but they shared their emphasis on different experiences producing different interests, which should then be pursued by interest organization through groups.<sup>6</sup>

These pluralists saw the state as passive, reacting to whatever groups happened to emerge. Given that they recognized few barriers to the emergence of interests and the organization of groups, they saw no need for public authority to intervene to affect the pattern of group representation (although they had no objection to the removal of barriers to group assertiveness, through, for example, civil rights legislation in the United States). In contrast, difference democrats see a variety of barriers to the emergence, recognition, organization, and assertiveness of groups. These barriers come mostly in the form of hierarchy and oppression, with cultural and economic as well as political causes. Whereas midcentury U.S. pluralism is passively inclusive in its pattern of representation in that it is prepared to accept whatever constellation of groups emerge from society to enter politics, difference democrats are more attuned to the need for actively inclusive representation, in which efforts are made to promote the ability of groups to recognize an interest and pursue it in politics. In this respect, they reveal a surprising affinity with James Madison's view of groups, or factions, as he would have called them; for Madison too did not believe that a desirable pattern of group representation emerges automatically.

Difference democrats are not always clear as to who does the recognizing and promoting. Cohen and Rogers (1992) are more forthright in their answer: the state. Sharing with both Madison and difference democrats the recognition that desirable patterns of interest organization and representation do not arise automatically (p. 426), they believe that the state should play an active role in sponsoring and certifying groups, removing obstacles to their exercising political influence, and creating channels for that influence to be felt in government. In particular, inequality of representation in their "associative democracy" should be remedied by state promotion of the organization of disadvantaged groups (p. 425). The kinds of associations Cohen and Rogers have in mind are mostly economic ones, especially categories of workers. Their emphasis on the economic basis of interest formation is shared by midcentury pluralists, though the latter were not, Dahl excepted, particularly interested in the working class.

State-sponsored association is proposed by Michael Walzer as an antidote to a rampant individualism that is producing "dissociated individuals" who are easy prey for antidemocratic demagogues (Walzer 1994, 189).<sup>7</sup> In

the United States at least, Walzer (1991, 125) believes conditions have deteriorated to the extent that "it makes sense to call the state to the rescue of civil society." Walzer recommends government sponsorship and subsidy for trade unions, for "cultural associations," defined in ethnic or religious terms, that provide welfare, education, and health services, for "charter schools" designed and managed by parents and teachers, for tenants' housing cooperatives, for workers' cooperatives, and for a wide range of community projects (1994, 189). Group life enhanced along these lines will, Walzer hopes, produce efficacious and tolerant citizens, but it requires "certain background or framing conditions that can only be provided by state action" involving "a political strategy for mobilizing, organizing, and, if necessary, subsidizing the right sort of groups" (p. 191).

Once mobilized, Walzer's "right sort of groups" are left free to participate in politics without further state support. In contrast, Cohen and Rogers believe such support should continue through the creation of channels and mechanisms enabling groups to influence public policy. With this continuation, the state-sponsored pattern of representation advocated in the associative democracy of Cohen and Rogers does, as they recognize, have more in common with corporatism than with liberalism.<sup>8</sup> Corporatism as a form for the organization of national political systems may be defined as a tripartite concertation of government, labor, and business, the last two represented by encompassing associations. All three partners are involved in the making and implementation of policy; institutions such as parliament play a comparatively minor role, as it is the executive that represents government. The essence of the corporatist bargain is that business supports policies geared to redistribution and full employment and does not disinvest in response to these policies. Labor, for its part, promises not to make life difficult for business through strikes or other forms of militancy. Government fosters the organization and representation of business and labor, guarantees their exclusive participation in policy-making, and in turn expects both business and labor associations to discipline their members (for further details, see Schmitter and Lehmbruch 1979). Corporatism of this sort has been practiced most effectively in Scandinavia, Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria, though elements of it exist in other European countries (and in Australia).

The democrat's problem with corporatism has always been that it is exclusive: Only business and labor are represented, and even the grass roots of labor have little influence. Interests defined on a noneconomic basis are shut out completely. Thus, recent theoretical works in the corporatist tradition (e.g., Schmitter 1992) have addressed how corporatism might be made more inclusive by granting a place at the table to noneconomic

<sup>6</sup> Early twentieth century pluralists such as Harold Laski (1919) and Mary Parker Follett (1918) have more in common with contemporary difference democrats than do Truman et al.

<sup>7</sup> Here, Walzer echoes the long-standing fear of mass society theorists such as Kornhauser (1959).

<sup>8</sup> A somewhat different model with the same name is developed by Hirst (1994). But whereas Cohen and Rogers propose an actively inclusive state, the state in Hirst's associative democracy is passively inclusive. In Hirst's model, democracy is built from the ground up by citizen associations which then take on many of the functions now performed by the state. The state's role is restricted to enabling such a process to occur, rather than to actively promoting it.

groups, such as environmentalists. The latter might agree to cease sponsoring boycotts, protests, or legal action against polluters and despoilers in return for commitments on the part of government, industry, and labor to antipollution measures and wilderness protection. Real-world corporatist systems have shown some signs of extending themselves in this direction. Notably, in Norway moderate environmental groups (such as Friends of the Earth) are partially funded by the state and have a recognized place in corporatist policymaking. Such extension—though for the most part only to interests defined on an economic basis—is exactly what Cohen and Rogers desire.

Iris Young applauds this kind of state-sponsored extension of representation, though she wants it to apply to the whole range of oppressed groups, not just economically defined ones. Connecting her earlier work on group representation with the idea of associative democracy, she avers in her commentary on Cohen and Rogers that “the state could decide to promote the self-organization of members of oppressed groups where such organization is weak, or to provide greater resources to existing associations representing oppressed or disadvantaged groups, and to create compensatory political forms to ensure that such groups have an equal voice in agenda setting and policy formation” (Young 1992, 532).

Theorists who seek democratization in the shadow of corporatism believe that corporatism’s best quality is its ability to actively include particular interests; the problem is only that historically a very limited range of interests has been included. I will suggest, in contrast, that the real beauty of corporatism is in its passive exclusion of many interests in society—and that it does this with a state that seems quite good at promoting economic justice (at least in comparison to all the alternative forms of state organization that have been tried from time to time).

Actively inclusive states exist mostly in the proposals of political theorists such as Cohen and Rogers, Walzer, and Young. Yet, there is one real-world example, though not one these theorists are likely to endorse. The Mexican state’s longevity and stability can be attributed to its brilliantly successful incorporation of successive waves of potential troublemakers. Until recently, both the means (patronage and coercion) and the ends were authoritarian. The 1988–94 Salinas administration’s PRONASOL (National Solidarity Campaign), however, added the trappings of grassroots participatory democracy to centralized state guidance. PRONASOL was directed at the social movement activists involved with the Cardenista opposition, which had probably won the 1988 presidential election. (The government claimed otherwise.) Oriented to the organization of peasants, workers, and disadvantaged communities, PRONASOL dismantled the opposition and employed many of its activists (see Carruthers 1995). Thus, the Mexican tradition of a strong state dominating a weak civil society could continue, though now with an inclusive democratic aspect, or at least veneer.

Let me now try to add an historical dimension to the analysis, which will justify suspicion of the actively inclusive state and thus demonstrate why the Mexican

outcome might well follow from the proposals of actively inclusive democratic theorists, however unwelcome this outcome might be to them. I will then outline the consequences of this suspicion for any strategy of democratization and proceed to consider where and how democrats might do better.

## INCLUSION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A democratizing strategy of the progressive inclusion of as many interests as possible in the state implies that the content of public policy is essentially indeterminate. Midcentury pluralists were most explicit on this point because they saw public policy, through a physics analogy, as the result of the direction and strength of whatever pressures were applied by different interest groups. Yet, this picture of indeterminacy is manifestly false, as pluralists such as Dahl (1989) and Lindblom (1982) themselves eventually came to recognize. Irrespective of what interest groups seek, states must meet certain imperatives. Unfortunately for advocates of state-sponsored group representation such as Cohen and Rogers and Young, promoting the organization of disadvantaged groups is not one of these imperatives, and I can imagine no scenario under which it becomes one. If so, then to advocate such representation may work as moral philosophy but not as political theory, for the latter must attend to practical constraints, as even Rawls (1987, 24) recognizes. Luckily for democrats, however, the imperatives of states are not constant over time; and this very inconstancy enabled democratization of the state to take place in the past. The implication here is that democratization of the state in the future is possible only to the extent that state imperatives continue to change. Before exploring this last point in more depth, let me turn to the content and history of the imperatives facing states.

According to Skocpol (1979), all states must survive in a hostile world, keep order internally, and extract the resources to finance survival and order, through some combination of taxation and compulsion of their own populations. When states alienate their own upper classes by leaning on them too heavily to finance their defense against external threats, these classes may withdraw support from the state, allowing revolution to commence. Skocpol applies this analysis to revolution in the agrarian bureaucracies of France, Russia, and China.

Though Skocpol writes as though these three imperatives apply unchangingly to all states, in fact their severe conjunction applies only in a Hobbesian world in which violent international conflict is a normal feature and the economic resource base available to states is more or less fixed. Conditions have changed for states now fortunate enough to belong to the global core, and they have been able to meet their imperatives in ways that have had positive consequences for democracy. (Life for states on the global periphery remains more Hobbesian.)

The first such modification comes with the rise of capitalist economies, and with them the potential for economic growth on a scale never seen before. States need no longer rely on punitive taxation or confiscation

to finance their defense against external threats; economic growth can help perform the same function in a less painful fashion. Thus, the first imperative facing states in capitalist systems is what post-Marxists (e.g., O'Connor 1984, Offe 1984) call "accumulation." States simply must provide the conditions that facilitate capitalist investment and economic growth; if they pursue antibusiness policies, then they are punished by "capital strike," recession, falling tax revenues, and unpopularity in the eyes of the public. Block (1977) and Lindblom (1982) have detailed the degree to which this "exchange-dependency" constricts the policies of states; markets, according to Lindblom, "imprison" government policy, and "pluralism at most operates only in an unimprisoned zone of policy making" (Lindblom 1982, 335). It is markets, especially financial ones, not public opinion or parliament, that are the sounding boards for public policy. And if policies are constricted, then so is democracy, for policies that contradict the fundamental interests of business must be vetoed, no matter how popular. As Bowles and Gintis (1986, 90) put it: "The presumed sovereignty of the democratic citizenry fails in the presence of capital strike." The ever-increasing mobility of capital across national boundaries intensifies this constraint (Dryzek 1996, 77-83).

Today, exchange dependency figures mostly as an impediment to democratization, but the opposite was once true. The importance of the accumulation imperative in the development of democracy is that it brought the interests of the state and of the emerging bourgeoisie into harmony, so that participation in policymaking could be extended to the bourgeoisie. It is easy to forget that the bourgeoisie was once an oppositional force in Western societies and constituted a democratic civil society hostile to the state. Habermas (1989) details the democratic life of the early bourgeois public sphere, as manifested in newspapers, coffee houses, and public association. He also notes the subsequent migration of the bourgeoisie from civil society to the state.

This migration was followed somewhat later (the timing, of course, varying by country) by the migration of the industrial working class; and again, this development can be related to the shifting content of state imperatives. Capitalism produces an industrial working class; and, as Karl Marx recognized, the conditions of its existence in urban centers and large factories enable it to constitute a political threat to the state in capitalist society. At the time Marx was writing, the activists of the organized working class constituted an oppositional sphere that confronted the state. Marx himself thought that opposition would culminate in revolution. What happened instead was that opposition gave way to inclusion. That choice was far from easy for socialist parties to make, and syndicalists, anarchists, and revolutionary Marxists mounted a protracted resistance to it in the early twentieth century (see Przeworski and Sprague 1986, 13-28). But for better or for worse, workers' parties and trade unions did come to play significant roles in electoral politics and public policymaking in many industrial societies. The degree of their inclusion remains quite variable, however, reaching a high point in social democratic corporatist societies, and

this inclusion has, for the most part, proven less easy and less complete than the earlier inclusion of the bourgeoisie. Strikes and demonstrations have been, at least until the last decade or so, part of the political repertoire of the organized working class.

Industrialization meant that the long-established state imperative of keeping internal order was no longer a matter of having coercive power sufficient to keep potential malcontents in line. Far more efficient, if it can be secured, is the *voluntary* acquiescence of potentially rebellious subordinate social classes and categories to the dominant political-economic order. Thus, the imperative of keeping internal order mutates over time into what neo-Marxists or post-Marxists such as Habermas (1975), O'Connor (1973), and Offe (1984), call legitimation. And the most effective device for legitimation so far devised, these authors aver, is the welfare state. In part, the working class can be induced to accept the capitalist political economy if it delivers the goods in the form of material prosperity, in which case legitimation can be assimilated to accumulation (assuming enough wealth trickles down). But the business cycles and employment insecurity endemic even to growing capitalist systems mean that something more is required, and this is where the Keynesian welfare state comes in. The fact that the Keynesian welfare state is now on the way out, or at least under attack, has some major negative consequences for democratization, which I will address shortly.

Legitimation is secured when subordinate classes and categories with the capacity to destabilize the political economy instead support or accept that structure. The best example of such a class or category in industrial societies has often been the working class, though groups defined on an ethnic or religious basis may also possess the capacity to destabilize. The threat to political stability posed by permanent ethnic or religious minorities forms the core of Arend Lijphart's argument for a consociational state that recognizes and incorporates the organizations of such minorities (see, e.g., Lijphart 1977). It should be stressed that the legitimation imperative does not reduce to a need for governments to court popularity. If it did, then every interest held by every group in society could be assimilated to the legitimation imperative, and the whole concept of a state imperative would dissolve into pluralism, thus losing all force. Only when the class or category in question has the capacity to destabilize is legitimation at issue. I will discuss the emergence of another threat to legitimation shortly.

## EMERGING STATE IMPERATIVES AND THE PROSPECTS FOR INCLUSION

The moral of the preceding historical tale is that oppositional groupings can only be included in the state in benign fashion when the defining interest of the grouping can be related quite directly to a state imperative.<sup>9</sup> Under this condition, groups can help determine the

<sup>9</sup> It is conceivable that a group's interest has no bearing at all upon state imperatives, in which case its inclusion or exclusion is of little interest from the perspective of democratization, as by definition that group will have no concern with the key public debates of the day.

content of public policy, at a minimum influencing how imperatives are met (e.g., legitimation might be promoted by either universalistic or means-tested welfare state programs), and how trade-offs between competing imperatives are made (i.e., to what extent should economic growth be sacrificed for the sake of redistribution?).

If the interest of an oppositional group cannot be so related to an imperative, then inclusion means that the group will be co-opted or bought off cheaply, as were the leaders of environmental interest groups who secured not only access but also employment at high levels in the Clinton administration, but found themselves unable to achieve much in the way of substantive policy. As Jay Hair, leader of the National Wildlife Federation, the largest of the co-opted groups, eventually put it, "What started out like a love affair turned out to be date rape" (Dowie 1995, 177). The group in question receives symbolic rewards only. Goodin (1980, 123-56) argues that such rewards are defensible if the symbols in question (e.g., religious rituals, flags, a member of one's ethnic group occupying the mayor's chair) have intrinsic value to the group. Symbolic rewards are correspondingly indefensible if they are offered as promissory notes for more tangible goods, but turn out to be substitutes for these goods.

To the extent that public policy remains under the sway of state imperatives, groups whose inclusion coincides with no imperative will not easily acquire the tangible goods they value. They may be allowed to participate in the policymaking process, but outcomes will be systematically skewed against them. Anything more would introduce a dangerous degree of indeterminacy into the content of public policy. A high price will be paid by any group included on this basis. For if state officials have no compelling reason to include the group, then presumably it must moderate its stance to fit with established state imperatives. Moreover, in entering the state, the group becomes constrained in the kinds of interactions in which it engages. In particular, the group may have to develop a more hierarchical internal structure in order to produce a stable leadership which government officials will recognize and deal with. Inclusion in the life of the state is, then, bought at the expense of relatively unrestricted democratic interplay in the oppositional public sphere. The democratic loss experienced by entry into the state can, as in the cases of the bourgeoisie and the working class in the past, be justified by the instrumental benefits thereby achieved. But if there are few or no instrumental benefits, the loss is harder to justify.

Of the group claims now endorsed by difference democrats and other advocates of inclusion, which, if any, can be related to established or emerging state imperatives? Their experience in the Clinton White House notwithstanding, I would consider the best claimants to be environmentalists, and the relevant emerging state imperative to be environmental conservation. This imperative itself develops out of the accumulation and legitimation imperatives. Now, accumulation and environmental conservation have traditionally been cast in a zero-sum relationship: Economic growth has to be foregone if the people are to enjoy environmental values.

But recent thinking reconceptualizes this relationship. Albert Weale (1992), among others, argues that the essence of the new environmental politics is "ecological modernization": the idea that economic growth and environmental values now stand in a positive-sum relationship because a clean environment is good for business. Why? First, a pleasant environment can substitute for income for employees. Second, dirty air and water hurt productivity. Third, consumers increasingly demand environmentally benign goods and services. Finally, pollution indicates inefficiency in materials use. Weale argues that ecological modernization has been incorporated into government policy most effectively in Germany; Hajer (1995) compares its limited progress in Britain with its more substantial gains in the Netherlands. In the United States, the kind of green capitalism advocated by Vice President Albert Gore (1992) is consistent with ecological modernization, though he does not use the term.

Environmental conservation can be linked to the legitimation imperative via Ulrich Beck's (1992) notion of "risk society." To Beck, politics is increasingly organized around the production and distribution of risks (mostly related to chemical, radioactive, and biotechnological hazards) rather than material goods. Those exposed to risks are so numerous, and so capable of political mobilization, that they threaten the stability of the political-economic order, and thus place legitimation at issue. In the face of widespread public mistrust of arrogant scientists and technologists and of their corporate and governmental employers, Beck believes that legitimation in risk society can only be achieved by public participation in risk selection, allocation, and amelioration.

Even if the ecological modernizers and risk democrats are correct, not all environmental concerns can be easily assimilated to state imperatives. Endangered species protection, wilderness preservation (especially when the wilderness contains valuable extractive resources), animal rights, and deep ecological conceptions of how to live in relation to nature are some of the aspects of environmentalism not easily assimilated. The solution here might be a "velvet divorce," in which part of the environmental movement enters the state, and part chooses to continue to confront the state from the public sphere. This describes the situation in a number of countries. Until their demise in the early 1990s, Green Fundis in Germany maintained a confrontational stance while their Realo counterparts pursued an ever more conventional electoral strategy. In the United States, a clear distinction remains between mainstream environmental groups on the one hand and radicals, such as Earth First!, animal liberationists, and networks organized around toxics and environmental justice issues on the other.

One might analyse contemporary feminism in similar terms: Liberal feminism is destined for the state, whereas cultural feminism is more suited to the public sphere. The feminization of work means that women's concerns about employment can be related to the accumulation imperative, as the prohibition of discrimination against women can actually be good for business in

general. If the patriarchal family is a remnant feudal structure, as Fraad, Resnick, and Wolff (1994) argue, then capitalism is now destroying feudalism's last hold-out by bringing women into the paid labor force (see also Beck 1992, 105). The feminization of poverty might indicate that aspects of feminism could be assimilated to the legitimization imperative, given the latter's association with the welfare state. But because poverty-stricken households headed by females do not constitute much of a political threat to the established order (in comparison with the organized working class during the period of its greatest strength), this assimilation seems unlikely. Cultural feminist demands for a different kind of politics based on the ethics of care and nurturing have no obvious connection to any state imperative, and so should not expect advances within the state.

## TO CIVIL SOCIETY

As yet I have said little about the precise characteristics of civil society and the public sphere as alternative sites for the pursuit of democracy. Civil society is an inexact concept, used in different ways by different authors. As a first approximation, civil society may be defined as all social interaction not encompassed by the state or the economy. In its political aspects it also excludes private life, although recent attacks by feminists and others on the public/private distinction make this boundary less clear. When discussing the prospects for democracy, the politicized aspects of civil society are most interesting. In this political sense, civil society consists of voluntary political association oriented by a relationship to the state, but not seeking any share in state power; that is, association is self-limiting (see Isaac 1993).

Prominent examples of civil society in action would include the early bourgeois public sphere discussed by Habermas (1989), the insurgent "free spaces" in U.S. political history constituted by women, blacks, workers, farmers, and others (Evans and Boyte 1986), the democratic opposition in Eastern Europe prior to 1989 (Arato 1993), and, in the West, feminist, antinuclear, peace, environmental, and urban new social movements. Such public spheres often feature relatively egalitarian and discursive politics in their internal workings (for further details, see Dryzek 1996, 47–53). They do not pursue power as interest groups or through electorally oriented parties; yet, they are, of course, concerned with public affairs. Often this concern casts them in opposition to the state and prominent economic actors, although sometimes state and corporate power can be ignored.

Civil society is a heterogeneous place, home to the Michigan Militia as well as the movements I have mentioned. Other groups—for example, Greenpeace—may be less overtly hostile to democratic values, but still quite hierarchical. Not everything in oppositional civil society represents discursive democratic vitality. So how do we distinguish between civil society formations that contribute to democratization and those that do not? Offe (1985, 853) excludes the religious right in the United States and neofascists in Europe from his purview by applying the criterion of commitment to "a selective radicalization of 'modern' values." Thus, to

Offe social movements are relevant to democratization to the degree that they fit an account of progress toward fulfillment of modernity's potential. Offe's viewpoint dovetails quite easily with my analysis of evolving state imperatives and their relation to changing patterns of inclusion and protest. While it is rare in practice, however, oppositional civil society groups can be both conservative in aims and democratic in internal structure. The U.S. anti-abortion group Operation Rescue might fall into this category. Its conservatism alone does not warrant its dismissal. Nor is hierarchy alone sufficient reason for dismissal: Despite its internal hierarchy, Greenpeace contributes to the democratic interplay of oppositional civil society. It is less easy to see how groups that are both conservative and hierarchical make any such contribution.

Self-limitation does not mean that civil society is a powerless realm. Power can be exercised from, and within, civil society in several ways. First, political action can change the terms of political discourse and so affect the content of public policy. The rhetorical achievements of Martin Luther King are exemplary here. King drew upon and reshaped the discourse of American constitutional liberalism in order to advance an agenda of civil rights for African-Americans. The women's movement has succeeded (not without resistance) in changing the ways in which gender, family, and the dividing line between public and private affairs are conceptualized in policy debates. In such fashion can "communicative power" assert itself over "administrative power," as Habermas (1992) puts it. Communicative power is diffuse and pervasive, felt in the way terms are defined and issues are framed, not in the direct leverage of one actor over another.

Second, as Tarrow (1994, 184–6) argues in reply to those who believe waves of political protest leave behind only burned-out or co-opted activists, social movements can produce lasting effects in political culture by legitimating particular forms of collective action, such as the sit-in, and by establishing a permanent place for issues on the public agenda.

Third, policy-oriented fora can be constituted within civil society. A good example is the Global Forum, which assembled as the civil society counterpart to the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio. Composed of nongovernmental activists from all over the world, the Global Forum influenced what occurred in the official proceedings of the conference, in part by shaming and embarrassing some of the official participants. Domestic environmental policy is sometimes influenced by such fora, concerned with issues such as renewable resources (Berger 1985) and toxic wastes (Fischer 1993).

Fourth, protest in civil society can create fear of political instability and thereby draw forth a governmental response. Piven and Cloward (1971) interpret the history of the U.S. welfare state in these terms: Welfare provision increases only in response to unruliness on the part of the poverty-stricken. Piven and Cloward do not imply that protest should be confined to civil society; they advise the poor to step up their demands on the state through conventional channels. Yet, their historical



account can be deployed as evidence of the power of civil society over the state.

These four civil society activities involve the more or less democratic exercise of power *over* the state, but they do not reduce to the inclusion of civil society *in* the state. In addition, civil society can reclaim power *from* the state—and from the economy. Indeed, Janicke (1994) defines civil society in functional terms, as public action in response to failure in government and the economy. This functional definition highlights the idea that civil society can itself feature problem solving, not merely talk. Civil society can, then, engage in “paragovernmental” activity, not simply act as a source of influence over the more obviously governmental activities of the state. There are numerous examples of this kind of activity. When feminists and others speak of “empowerment,” they do not mean influence over government but rather control of their own lives, facilitated by support groups and the like. Disputes within communities can be settled through alternative dispute resolution without involving courts, as for example in the community boards of San Francisco (Schlosberg 1995). Citizens can exercise power directly over economic actors through means such as boycotts of corporations or products. In 1995 Greenpeace organized protests against the Shell Oil corporation’s plan to dispose of the redundant Brent Spar oil platform in the North Atlantic. Shell eventually capitulated, much to the annoyance of the British government, which was prepared to use force to dislodge protestors from the platform.

A final and somewhat different way in which power can be exercised through civil society is by means of cultural change that affects power relations. Think, for example, of the extent to which feminism has changed power relationships both within and outside the family (and not just as a consequence of changes in family law). Even if civil society actions leave public policy untouched, they can have real social effects. Along these lines, Tesh (1993) sees the success of new social movements in terms of the changes they produce in ethics and culture, and therefore in behavior in everyday life, for example in relationships between the sexes, or in people’s awareness of pollutants and the environmental friendliness of products.

Civil society can constitute a site for democratization because it can be a place where people choose to live their public lives and solve their joint problems. Those who see deliberation as the essence of democracy (e.g., Cohen 1989, Miller 1992) should be attracted by the discursive style of public spheres. The postmodern theorists (e.g., Connolly 1991), who are very different in that they conceptualize democracy in terms of agonistic respect established through the negotiation of identities and differences, should likewise be attracted to the pluralistic politics of identity in the public sphere. Yet another form of democracy, Hannah Arendt’s democratic “oases in the desert” of a sterile modernity, can only be found in civil society. Critics of Arendt argue that she was happy to purchase democratic authenticity at the expense of democratic franchise. But as Isaac (1994, 158) points out, the “elites” populating these oases are self-selected and can come from any social class; and

they rule over themselves, not over anyone else, which is why Arendt viewed a workers’ council as an exemplary “elite.”

But why should civil society often be more attractive than the state as a site for democratization? The answer is that it is relatively unconstrained. Discourse need not be suppressed in the interests of strategic advantage; goals and interests need not be compromised or subordinated to the pursuit of office or access; embarrassing troublemakers need not be repressed; the indeterminacy of outcome inherent in democracy need not be subordinated to state policy.

## THE DEMOCRATIC BENEFITS OF EXCLUSIVE STATES

There is, then, much to be said for democratic life in civil society as opposed to democratic life in the state. But the state and its structure cannot be ignored, for how states are organized turns out to have major implications for the democratic vitality of civil society. If the impetus for democratization begins in oppositional civil society rather than in the state—and I would suggest that this has almost always been true historically—then, counter-intuitively, a degree of *exclusion* in the pattern of state interest representation is desirable if civil society and so democracy itself are to flourish. But what kind of exclusionary state is at issue here?

I have already noted that inclusive states can be either passive (in the sense of accepting whatever groups emerge from society) or active (in taking steps to mobilize particular groups and shepherding them into the state)—and that both passively and actively inclusive states have their hazards for democracy in civil society. Similarly, states that pursue exclusion can do so in either an active or a passive fashion. Active exclusion implies a state that attacks and undermines the conditions for public association in civil society. Passive exclusion implies a state that simply leaves civil society alone.

Examples of these two kinds of exclusion can be found in the histories of both the West and the former Soviet bloc. In the Soviet bloc, active exclusion characterized true Stalinism, under which any sign of political organization separate from the state was sought out and snuffed out. With time and the loss of true believers, the Stalinist state’s energies flagged in this respect. The more passive exclusion of halfhearted Stalinism, especially in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, proved far more conducive to the establishment and survival of oppositional public spheres (see Bunce 1992). Movements such as Solidarity in Poland and Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia had no access to the state, but neither were they obliterated (even though their members were harassed and occasionally imprisoned).

In the West, the main actively exclusionary form of state interest representation is authoritarian liberalism, practiced with varying zeal in the Anglo-American world in the 1980s (and, in some cases, in the 1990s). Authoritarian liberalism involves maximization of the role of the market in organizing society, in combination with attacks on the conditions of public association in civil society. Along these lines, Britain under Margaret

Thatcher experienced attacks on the ability of trades unions to organize workers, on press freedom, on the ability of civil servants to divulge information (even about government activities unrelated to national security), on the legal rights of defendants in court cases, on the freedom of local authorities from central government control, on the independence of the British Broadcasting Corporation, and on the political neutrality of the police. Not only did the collectivism of the left come under attack but also organic "one nation" Toryism was destroyed by the Thatcherites. Authoritarian liberals even tried, with some success, to reverse the historical inclusion of the working class in the state. The Trades Unions Congress was expelled from the quasi-corporatist National Economic Development Council, and unions were subjected to new legal restrictions on their ability to organize workers and take industrial action. The inclusion of the working class had never been very pronounced in the United States, but the expulsion of organized labor was symbolized by the Reagan administration's unopposed destruction of PATCO, the air traffic controllers' union, in 1982. In both cases, the legitimation or welfare state imperative associated with the initial inclusion of the working class also came under attack, and more coercive means of social control came back into fashion. All this can be attributed, in part, to deindustrialization and the associated dissolution of the working class. The organized working class became less of a threat than it once was, and so its link to the legitimation imperative could be weakened, if not severed.

These kinds of governmental attacks on the conditions for association in civil society can be hindered, if not prevented, by constitutional restraints. Walzer (1991) argues that the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution protects not only the private realm of individual life but also the associational realm of civil society. According to Walzer's account, the authors of the Bill of Rights assumed the existence of this associational realm, whose subsequent atrophy meant that these rights came to be interpreted as applying to private individuals rather than to public associations. Still, the absence of any comparable constitutional defenses in Britain may help to explain the relative ease with which the Thatcherite agenda for the individualization of civil society was implemented in the 1980s. Earlier I argued that one should not expect a great deal in the way of positive commitment to the associational life of civil society on the part of governmental officials, the hopes of Walzer and others notwithstanding. Constitutional and legal defenses for civil society should be welcomed, however, when they can be obtained from governments. Beyond the Bill of Rights, other U.S. examples are the 1935 National Labor Relations Act, which established the rights of unions to engage in collective bargaining, civil rights legislation in the 1960s, and more recent changes in family law. Such measures need not be accompanied by the entry of the protected associations into the state in the terms I defined at the outset.

Such constitutional and legal restraints are less necessary under corporatism. Corporatism, as I noted earlier, is characterized by a bargain involving government,

business, and labor, the terms of which do not allow other interests to have any say in policy formation and implementation. Corporatist states do not attack or undermine the conditions for public association in civil society; they simply ignore it by offering no channels of access to the state. Thus, the passive exclusion associated with corporatism is more benign for democracy in civil society than is the active exclusion of authoritarian liberalism. One major reason for the rise of new social movements representing environmental, feminist, anti-nuclear, and peace values in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s was the exclusive pattern of interest representation adopted by corporatist states such as West Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria (Kitschelt 1988). If one also notes here the comparative effectiveness of these states in delivering social justice (via income redistribution) full employment, and even economic growth (Freeman 1989; Pekkarin, Pohjola, and Rowthorn 1992), then there is indeed much to be said for social democratic corporatism as a form of state organization. The democratic potential of corporatism is not in the inclusions it can arrange, but in the exclusions it generates by default.

An examination of contemporary states using comparative statics would conclude that corporatism is the state model most conducive to a democratic civil society (see also, Dryzek 1996, 64–70). But an historical extension of the analysis reveals that corporatist states are themselves the product of inclusion in the state of groups previously operating in civil society, first the bourgeoisie and then the organized working class. These two inclusions could proceed only under particular conjunctions of group interest and changing state imperatives. As I have indicated in discussions of environmentalism and the women's movement, changing circumstances might lead to a revision of this provisional verdict on corporatism, especially if the latter is defined in strictly tripartite terms. The provisional conclusion in favor of passive exclusion, of which tripartite corporatism is the most visible contemporary example, is less easily shaken.

For better or worse, corporatist states may continue to change in response to groups operating in civil society and claiming access to the state (or indeed forsaking the state in favor of civil society). Such claims are sometimes futile if the state has no obvious point of access. But even strong corporatist states, which Lehmbruch (1984) identifies as Austria, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden, sometimes open up access points—for example, for environmentalists in Norway in the 1990s, as I noted earlier. And most contemporary states in developed societies are not strongly corporatist, instead falling somewhere on a continuum between corporatism and pluralism. (See Lehmbruch 1984 for a classification of countries in these terms.) What, then, should guide the strategic choices of groups when the possibility of access to the state does arise?

## MOVEMENT STRATEGY AND STATE RESPONSE

Observers of social movement dynamics often argue that eventually groups must choose the state over civil soci-

ety. Given that mass activism is hard to sustain, what Tarrow (1994) calls "cycles of protest" normally end in some degree of bureaucratization coupled with incorporation into the state, at least in liberal democratic societies. Indeed, the movement may not escape fading into oblivion, and in more authoritarian systems, it may end in repression. To the extent that such cycles are inescapable, entry into the state (through any, some, or all of the means I defined at the outset) may be a pragmatic necessity, not a free strategic choice. Claus Offe (1990) argues that movements normally pass through three stages. The "takeoff" phase in civil society is informal, spontaneous, and militant. Such inchoate, unfocused energy fades as the movement reaches what he calls a "stagnation" phase ("consolidation" would have fewer pejorative connotations), involving definition of group membership, leadership, and organization. The third stage is "institutionalization," or what I have termed inclusion in, or entry into, the state. Offe believes that such institutionalization can be expected as a rational use of limited resources of time, energy, and finance and as a way of sustaining a movement when supporters are not ready to contribute anything more than votes and money. The movement can then "cash in" the resources it has mobilized in its takeoff and consolidation phases to achieve access to real political power (p. 243). Thus, Offe believes that entry into the state can be a good bargain. Other observers (for example, Lowi 1971) believe that such entry normally means co-option. I would suggest, in contrast, that one cannot generalize about and evaluate such entry in any sweeping terms. Whether the third stage of the life cycle should be welcomed or lamented depends crucially on the particular configuration of movement interests and state imperatives.

A close look at the historical record casts doubt on this life-cycle interpretation of social movements. Offe himself admits that when the available range of public policy solutions to movement concerns is manifestly inadequate, then there are good reasons for a section of the movement to resist institutionalization—an insight he applies to the German Greens (Offe 1990, 246–7). Rucht (1990) notes that new social movements, in particular environmentalism in France and Germany, have featured simultaneous and sustained action in the state and civil society. Cohen and Arato (1992, 555–7) make a similar observation about feminism in the United States. This record suggests that groups are not locked into any simple life cycle; they do have choices. Faced with such a choice, should a group choose civil society, the state, or both simultaneously?

Cohen and Arato (1992) advance a blanket "both" guideline, which they call a "dualistic" strategy for social movements. They regard the women's movement as exemplary: "The dual logic of feminist politics . . . involves a communicative, discursive politics of identity and influence that targets civil and political society and an organized, strategically rational politics of inclusion and reform that is aimed at political and economic institutions" (p. 550). In civil society, movements would act "to redefine identities, to reinterpret norms, and to develop egalitarian, democratic associational forms" (p.

531). In the state, groups would not only pursue group goals, but also seek the development of a supportive constitutional, legal, and policy context for continued movement activity in civil society. Legislation and policy in turn would draw sustenance from a supportive cultural context in civil society (p. 552). A large part of the justification for their dualistic strategy, therefore, turns out to be the degree to which the state can influence the democratic condition of civil society, for better or for worse.

A similar "both" position is argued by Hilary Wainwright (1994), though for the sake of the achievement of substantive group ends rather than for the democratic vitality of civil society. She avers that movement goals related to, for example, ecological and equity values "require democratic decision making with binding national and international authority" which can only be supplied by the state (p. 195). Without movement activism in civil society, such public policy action is unlikely (p. 197); but again, echoing Cohen and Arato, "non-state forms of political action need a supportive and independent relationship to political power if they are to be effective agents of economic and social change" (p. 190). Though sympathetic to Offe's life-cycle reasons for entry into the state, she believes that parliamentary activity can involve permanent sustenance for the extraparliamentary movement, rather than constituting a permanent substitute for the latter (p. 196).

These arguments for a "both" answer or a "dualistic" strategy appear to be good ones. But they imply a benign view of the actual or potential motivations of government officials. One might hope that public officials would recognize the need for a lively civil society and formulate policies to promote it, perhaps even along the lines proposed by Walzer that I discussed earlier. The problem remains that there is absolutely no reason for public officials to behave in the way Walzer suggests, and every reason for them to behave otherwise if the strengthening of particular civil society groups clashes with an established state imperative. Walzer's own agenda of stronger unions, housing cooperatives, workers' cooperatives, and subsidized community-based welfare provision promises plenty of trouble for state officials.

Beyond laws protecting the basic citizenship rights of expression and association, one should not expect much in the way of positive state action to promote the well-being of civil society. Cohen and Arato and Wainwright might object here that, unlike Walzer, they do not seek much in the way of positive commitment by state actors, they merely advocate acceptance of the legitimacy of movement goals and of the continued linkage of group leaders with more uncompromising extraparliamentary movement wings. But such tolerance may be stretched to the limit if movement goals, especially as articulated in radical terms by the civil society wing, clash with state imperatives. In this light, let me suggest that two criteria are relevant to any group's choice between civil society, the state, and a "dualistic" strategy. First, the group should consider whether its defining interest can be assimilated to any state imperative. If the answer is no, then entry into the state is a poor strategy in instrumental terms, for it is unlikely that the group's

goals will be embodied in public policy; and entry is bad for democracy, because the vigorous democratic life of the public sphere will be forsaken in favor of co-option and a politics of symbolic rewards.

This first criterion may not always allow a once-and-for-all answer. I noted earlier that state imperatives change with time. Such changes are not easily predicted, but if they do occur, a group should be prepared to change its choice. Around 1980 it would have been hard to predict the assimilation of environmental concerns to the imperatives of accumulation and legitimation. Developing notions of ecological modernization and risk society have made this assimilation possible, as I noted earlier. In Germany, these developments help to justify the "Realo" Green Party's eventual choice of wholehearted entry into the state. (One might argue that these developments are themselves due, in part, to a social learning process initiated by the Greens; but such learning can issue from civil society just as easily as from, or within, the state, and so provides no argument for preemptive entry into the state.)

Changing state imperatives might also lead a group to reconsider a past decision to enter the state. Such entry may have been a good bargain for the organized working class for most of the twentieth century. More recently, deindustrialization and the consequent decline in the numbers of industrial workers and limitation of the scope of the Keynesian welfare state mean that working-class interests are no longer as easily aligned with the legitimation imperative as they once were. These developments and difficulties, however, have not persuaded the leadership of social democratic parties to contemplate a return to oppositional civil society. To the contrary, their normal response has been strategic moderation in the hope of appealing to non-working-class constituencies, or positioning the party to secure what Kitschelt (1994) calls the "pivotal" vote in coalition politics, having abandoned any desire to govern on behalf of an electoral majority garnered from the working class. But this strategic moderation has itself led some activists to abandon the party in favor of civil society alternatives.

The second criterion to be considered is whether the group's entry into the state would leave behind a flourishing civil society. If the answer is no, then a depleted civil society would mean a less democratic polity, even though it might mean a more democratic state. But even the latter is unlikely. For if all disadvantaged and oppositional groups commit themselves to conventional political channels, then there is less reason for the state to include them. In this context, Fisk (1989, 178-9) argues that "only if there is a continuation of politics by extraparliamentary means will democracy be able to establish limits to the power of a dominant class," because extraparliamentary protest is a standing warning to this class of what might happen if it is unresponsive to demands made through conventional channels (see also Wainwright 1994, 197). And, of course, much is lost with the depletion of civil society. This loss is not always noted, still less lamented, but an example of such depletion can be seen in connection with the success of socialist parties in electoral politics. As Przeworski and

Sprague (1986, 184) observe, with this apparent success these parties "demobilized those potential efforts—cooperatives, councils, and communes—that could not be channelled through elections; they deprived grassroots initiatives of a chance to experiment and grow autonomously; they turned nascent movements into compliance with electoral tactics."

Consider also, in light of this second criterion, the migration of East European civil society into the state during and following the successful revolutions of 1989. This migration left behind little or nothing in terms of oppositional public spheres. The gain was a liberal democratic state; the loss was of discursive democratic vitality. Former participants in and observers of oppositional civil society experienced a real sense of loss (see Ash 1990). Such losses can also be observed in connection with the entry of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament into the British Labour Party around 1960, the entry of the 1960s U.S. civil rights movement into the Democratic Party, the demise of the "Fundis" Greens in Germany in the 1990s, and the Mexican opposition's participation in the regime's PRONASOL initiative after 1988, which I discussed earlier.

Now, not all civil society groups care about democracy, whether in their internal workings or in the polity more generally. Some groups, therefore, might see no reason to apply these two criteria, if it is only the well being of democracy that is at issue. Both criteria, however, have an instrumental as well as a democratic aspect. The first criterion asks a group to consider whether its presence in the state will indeed be accompanied by real influence. The second asks the group to contemplate the potential impairment of its influence resulting from the loss of a standing warning to dominant actors attendant upon the group's wholesale commitment to conventional politics. Thus, the two criteria are relevant to group strategy irrespective of the degree of commitment to democracy as such.

Whether a group should choose the state, civil society, or both simultaneously depends on the particular configuration of movement interests and state imperatives. None of these three answers is right for all movements at all times and in all places. I would argue that the popular "dualistic" strategy is appropriate only when some but not all of a movement's defining interests can be assimilated to state imperatives. As I argued earlier, liberal feminism may be at home in the state, whereas cultural feminism should remain in civil society. Similarly, environmental concerns that can be connected to risk, ecological modernization, or sustainable development can be expressed in state-related action, while the dimensions of environmentalism that pose a more radical challenge to the imperatives of industrial society and its governments belong in civil society. Sometimes the two wings may choose to part company. For example, on the one hand, the emerging network of groups concerned with environmental justice and toxics issues in the United States have distanced themselves from mainstream groups to the point of refusing the label "environmentalist." On the other hand, mainstream groups may, overtly or covertly, welcome the activities of their more radical counterparts in civil society; note the

variety of reactions mainstream environmentalists have to the radical Earth First! group in the United States. At any rate, in such "dualistic" circumstances the identity of the movement as a single entity should also be on its agenda. (For an account of these tensions in American environmentalism, see Dowie 1995.)

A group's calculus in terms of the two criteria will be influenced by the mode of inclusion available to it. No unrestricted choice of mode is at issue here, for the structures of different political systems provide different opportunities. For example, in the United States there are many barriers to, and few opportunities for, new political parties; therefore, a movement's entry to the state normally comes via interest group politics. Germany, in contrast, provides public subsidy and free media access for any party once it has gained a small percentage of the vote, but it allows relatively few opportunities for U.S.-style interest groups. Inclusion is therefore more likely via a party route. It is hard to generalize about the effects of these variations in structural opportunity, if indeed they do make a difference; a great deal depends on the details of particular cases. For example, the national list system of proportional representation in Israeli elections makes inclusion via the party route very easy, but at the same time mandates the specification in very precise detail of a national party hierarchy. Other proportional representation systems work on a constituency basis, and thus provide more scope for local party organizations to retain some autonomy. One might hypothesize that the latter would be more conducive to the continuing democratic vitality of civil society than the former, and so to a "dualistic" movement strategy; but this is just a hypothesis. Observers of social movement dynamics and life cycles rarely draw any distinctions between, or make comparisons of, the different ways a movement can ultimately be incorporated into the state, so there is little useful comparative literature to draw on here.

Life-cycle theorists and dualists alike hold that some degree of association with the state is eventually necessary and desirable, if only to maintain a powerful and permanent presence for a movement. But, as I argued earlier, choosing civil society rather than the state does not necessarily imply choosing powerlessness. Nor does this choice imply impermanence. A movement's concerns can persist even when its action is less visible, for civil society can be sustained in social and political networks and reproduced through cultural transformation after more spectacular manifestations of the movement have passed (see Melucci 1989, 206; Tarrow 1994, 176-7).

## CONCLUSION

Let me now summarize my account of the dynamics of democratization. First, democratization is largely, though not exclusively, a matter of the progressive recognition and inclusion of different groups in the political life of society. This general inclusion is in turn sometimes manifested in inclusion in the life of the state. Because pressures and movements for democratization almost always originate in civil society rather than in the

state, however, a flourishing oppositional civil society is the key to further democratization. This sort of civil society is actually facilitated by a passively exclusive state. A truly inclusive state would corrode the vitality of civil society (as the Mexican case illustrates), and so undermine the conditions for further democratization. Thus, every historical step the state takes toward inclusion should produce a pattern of exclusions as well. These exclusions are the seeds for, if nothing else, future and further democratization of the state; and they offer protection against the state's reversing its democratic commitments. Exemplary here was the creation of the social democratic corporatist state: labor was explicitly included, and a whole range of other groups were implicitly excluded by the very way in which labor was included. Thus, democrats, even difference democrats, should not interpret democratization as a matter of the state recognizing and welcoming an increasingly diverse range of groups and interests. Inclusion of this sort is only benign when a group's defining interest can be associated with an established or emerging state imperative, and when entry into the state does not unduly deplete the civil society left behind. Occasionally, these criteria allow a group to operate in both civil society and the state; but often they dictate that one or the other be chosen.

## REFERENCES

- Arato, Andrew. 1993. "Interpreting 1989." *Social Research* 60 (3):609-46.
- Arendt, Hannah. 1958. *The Human Condition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Ash, Timothy Garton. 1990. *The Uses of Adversity: Essays on the Fate of Central Europe*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Beck, Ulrich. 1992. *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. London: Sage.
- Berger, Thomas. 1985. *Village Journey: The Report of the Alaska Native Review Commission*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Block, Fred. 1977. "The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State." *Socialist Revolution* 7 (3):6-28.
- Bowles, Samuel, and Herbert Gintis. 1986. *Democracy and Capitalism: Property, Community, and the Contradictions of Modern Social Thought*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Bunce, Valerie. 1992. "Two-Tiered Stalinism: A Case of Self-Destruction." In *Constructing Capitalism: The Re-Emergence of Civil Society and Liberal Economy in the Post-Communist World*, ed. K. Z. Poznanski. Boulder: Westview.
- Carruthers, David V. 1995. "The Political Economy of Indigenous Mexico: Social Mobilization and State Reform." Ph.D. dissertation; University of Oregon.
- Cohen, Jean L., and Andrew Arato. 1992. *Civil Society and Political Theory*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Cohen, Joshua. 1989. "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy." In *The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State*, ed. Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Cohen, Joshua, and Joel Rogers. 1992. "Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance." *Politics and Society* 20 (4):393-472.
- Connolly, William E. 1991. *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Crozier, Michel, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki. 1975. *The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission*. New York: New York University Press.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1956. *A Preface to Democratic Theory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1989. *Democracy and its Critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dowie, Mark. 1995. *Losing Ground: American Environmentalism at the Close of the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

- Dryzek, John S. 1996. *Democracy in Capitalist Times: Ideals, Limits, and Struggles*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Evans, Sarah M., and Harry C. Boyte. 1986. *Free Spaces: The Sources of Democratic Change in America*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Fischer, Frank. 1993. "Citizen Participation and the Democratization of Policy Expertise: From Theoretical Inquiry to Practical Cases." *Policy Sciences* 26 (3):165-87.
- Fisk, Milton. 1989. *The State and Justice: An Essay in Political Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Follett, Mary Parker. 1918. *The New State: Group Organizations—The Solution of Popular Government*. New York: Longmans Green.
- Fraad, Harriet, Stephen Resnick, and Richard Wolf. 1994. *Bringing It All Back Home: Class, Gender, and Power in the Modern Household*. London: Pluto.
- Freeman, John R. 1989. *Democracy and Markets: The Politics of Mixed Economies*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Goodin, Robert E. 1980. *Manipulatory Politics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Gore, Albert. 1992. *Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Habermas, Jurgen. 1975. *Legitimation Crisis*. Boston: Beacon.
- Habermas, Jurgen. 1989. *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Habermas, Jurgen. 1992. *Faktizität und Geltung*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Hajer, Maarten A. 1995. *The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hirst, Paul. 1994. *Associative Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social Governance*. Cambridge, U.K.: Polity.
- Isaac, Jeffrey C. 1993. "Civil Society and the Spirit of Revolt." *Dissent* 40 (3):356-61.
- Isaac, Jeffrey C. 1994. "Oases in the Desert: Hannah Arendt on Democratic Politics." *American Political Science Review* 88 (1): 156-68.
- Janicke, Martin. 1994. "Democracy as a Condition for Environmental Policy Success: Insights from International Comparison." Presented to the Workshop on Democracy and the Environment, Oxford.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 1988. "Left-Libertarian Parties: Explaining Innovation in Competitive Party Systems." *World Politics* 40 (2):194-234.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kornhauser, William. 1959. *The Politics of Mass Society*. New York: Free Press.
- Laclau, Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. 1985. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. London: Verso.
- Laski, Harold J. 1919. *Authority in the Modern State*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lehmbruch, Gerhard. 1984. "Concertation and the Structure of Corporatist Networks." In *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism*, ed. John H. Goldthorpe. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Lindblom, Charles E. 1982. "The Market as Prison." *Journal of Politics* 44 (2):324-36.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1977. *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lowi, Theodore J. 1971. *The Politics of Disorder*. New York: Basic Books.
- Melucci, Alberto. 1989. *Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Müller, David. 1992. "Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice." *Political Studies* 40 (special issue):54-67.
- O'Connor, James. 1973. *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*. New York: St. Martin's.
- O'Connor, James. 1984. *Accumulation Crisis*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Offe, Claus. 1984. *Contradictions of the Welfare State*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Offe, Claus. 1985. "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics." *Social Research* 52 (4):817-68.
- Offe, Claus. 1990. "Reflections on the Institutional Self-Transformation of Movement Politics: A Tentative Stage Model." In *Challenging the Political Order: New Social Movements in Western Democracies*, ed. Russell J. Dalton and Manfred Kuechler. Cambridge: Polity.
- Pekkarinen, Jukka, Matti Pohjola, and Bob Rowthorn. 1992. *Social Corporatism: A Superior Economic System?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Phillips, Anne. 1993. *Democracy and Difference*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Phillips, Anne. 1995. *The Politics of Presence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard A. Cloward. 1971. *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare*. New York: Random House.
- Przeworski, Adam, and John Sprague. 1986. *Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rawls, John. 1987. "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus." *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies* 7 (1):1-25.
- Rucht, Dieter. 1990. "The Strategies and Action Repertoires of New Movements." In *Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies*, ed. Russell J. Dalton and Manfred Kuechler. Cambridge: Polity.
- Saward, Michael. 1992. *Co-optive Politics and State Legitimacy*. Aldershot: Dartmouth.
- Schlosberg, David. 1995. "Communicative Action in Practice: Inter-subjectivity and New Social Movements." *Political Studies* 43 (2): 291-311.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. 1992. "The Irony of Modern Democracy and Efforts to Improve its Practice." *Politics and Society* 20 (4):505-12.
- Schmitter, Philippe C., and Gerhard Lehmbruch, eds. 1979. *Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation*. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Selznick, Philip. [1949] 1966. *TVA and the Grass Roots: A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Skocpol, Theda. 1979. *States and Social Revolutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tesh, Sylvia N. 1993. "New Social Movements and New Ideas." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC.
- Truman, David B. 1951. *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion*. New York: Knopf.
- Wainwright, Hilary. 1994. *Arguments for a New Left: Answering the Free-Market Right*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Walzer, Michael. 1991. "Constitutional Rights and the Shape of Civil Society." In *The Constitution of the People: Reflections on Citizens and Civil Society*, ed. Robert E. Calvert. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Walzer, Michael. 1994. "Multiculturalism and Individualism." *Dissent* 41 (2):185-91.
- Weale, Albert. 1992. *The New Politics of Pollution*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Young, Iris Marion. 1989. "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship." *Ethics* 99 (2):250-74.
- Young, Iris Marion. 1990. *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Young, Iris Marion. 1992. "Social Groups in Associative Democracy." *Politics and Society* 20 (4):529-34.